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Abstract
Sponsored search is an important monetization
channel for search engines, in which an auction
mechanism is used to select the ads shown to users
and determine the prices charged from advertisers.
There have been several pieces of work in the lit-
erature that investigate how to design an auction
mechanism in order to optimize the revenue of the
search engine. However, due to some unrealistic as-
sumptions used, the practical values of these stud-
ies are not very clear. In this paper, we propose a
novel game-theoretic machine learning approach,
which naturally combines machine learning and
game theory, and learns the auction mechanism us-
ing a bilevel optimization framework. In particular,
we first learn a Markov model from historical data
to describe how advertisers change their bids in re-
sponse to an auction mechanism, and then for any
given auction mechanism, we use the learnt model
to predict its corresponding future bid sequences.
Next we learn the auction mechanism through em-
pirical revenue maximization on the predicted bid
sequences. We show that the empirical revenue will
converge when the prediction period approaches in-
finity, and a Genetic Programming algorithm can
effectively optimize this empirical revenue. Our
experiments indicate that the proposed approach
is able to produce a much more effective auction
mechanism than several baselines.
1 Introduction
Sponsored search is an important means of Internet moneti-
zation, and is the driving force of major search engines to-
day. In sponsored search, keyword auction is used to de-
termine the ranking and pricing of the ads, and thus affects
the revenue of the search engine. The research on auction
mechanism design has attracted the attention of many re-
searchers from the areas of artificial intelligence and elec-
tronic commerce [Broder et al., 2007; Graepel et al., 2010;
Edelman et al., 2005].
In keyword auctions, each advertiser is required to submit a
bid for his/her ad. When the keyword is issued by a web user,
the search engine will rank the ads, show the top-ranked ones
to the user, and then charge the corresponding advertisers in
certain conditions (e.g., if their ads are clicked). Generalized
second price (GSP) auction is a family of auction mechanisms
that has been popularly used by today’s search engines, which
ranks ads according to the products of their bid prices and
quality scores; and charges a clicked ad by the minimum bid
price to maintain its current rank position.
Given the critical role of the auction mechanism in spon-
sored search, many people have studied the optimization of
its performance in terms of search engine revenue [Lahaie
and Pennock, 2007; Garg et al., 2007; Zhu et al., 2009b;
Radlinski et al., 2008; Zhu et al., 2009a]. These studies
can be categorized into two groups. The first group [Lahaie
and Pennock, 2007; Garg et al., 2007] addresses the prob-
lem from a game-theoretic perspective. Some works in this
group optimize the worse-case revenue in symmetric Nash
equilibria; some others consider Bayesian optimal mecha-
nism design with the knowledge of bidders’ value distribu-
tion. They usually require strong (and somewhat unrealistic)
assumptions on the game, such as the full information about
the values/bids of the bidders (or their distributions) and the
full rationality of the bidders. However, empirical evidence
has shown that these assumptions might not hold in prac-
tice, especially considering that sponsored search auctions
are complex, fast-paced, and involve a very large number of
bidders[Pin and Key, 2011; Duong and Lahaie, 2011; Edel-
man and Ostrovsky, 2007]. In such a real situation, advertis-
ers will have limited information access and bounded ratio-
nality, therefore it is inappropriate to perform classical game-
theoretic analysis based on the aforementioned assumptions.
The second group [Zhu et al., 2009b; Radlinski et al., 2008;
Zhu et al., 2009a] tackles the task from a machine learning
perspective, in particular, directly adopts conventional ma-
chine learning methods to optimize the revenue on historical
bidding data. The underlying assumption is that the bid dis-
tribution will not change over time thus the optimal auction
mechanism learnt from historical data can generalize to future
test data. However, as we know, there is a so-called second-
order effect in sponsored search, i.e., many advertisers will
adjust the bids according to their utilities, as the responses to
a new auction mechanism. As a result, the “optimal” auction
mechanism directly learnt from historical bidding data will
no longer be optimal after it is deployed since advertisers will
change their bids in response to it.
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To overcome the above drawbacks, we propose a novel ap-
proach, which can naturally combine game theory and ma-
chine learning using a bilevel optimization framework, so as
to simultaneously avoid the strong assumptions and handle
the second-order effect. For ease of reference, we call the
approach a game-theoretic machine learning approach. Gen-
erally speaking, in the approach, we first learn an advertiser
behavior model from historical data to describe how adver-
tisers change their bids in response to a given auction mech-
anism. We then predict advertiser’s bid changes using this
model during the process of auction mechanism learning.
Specifically, when building the advertiser behavior model,
we consider that the advertisers do not have a very good
knowledge about the detailed auction mechanism or the
bids of other advertisers. Instead, they adjust their bids
mainly based on the previous bids of their own and the sig-
nals provided by the search engine. We assume the time-
homogeneous Markov property for this dependency, and the
signals mainly include the number of impressions, the num-
ber of clicks, and the average cost per click (which are re-
ferred to as Key Performance Index, or KPI for short). We
learn the parametric transition matrix of the Markov model by
a maximum likelihood method. For the next step, the learnt
advertiser behavior model is used to predict the future bid se-
quences of the advertisers after a new auction mechanism is
deployed. Then we estimate the revenue of the search engine
over the predicted mechanism-dependent bids in a finite time
period (based on the historical logs), and call this quantity
the empirical revenue under the advertiser behavior model.
We prove that the empirical revenue of an arbitrary auction
mechanism will converge when the length of the sequence
approaches infinity, and then apply Genetic Programming to
search for the optimal auction mechanism in terms of this em-
pirical revenue.
We have conducted preliminary experiments to test the pro-
posed approach. The experiments show very promising re-
sults: our learnt auction mechanism can outperform several
baselines including the widely used classic GSP auction.
2 Game-theoretic Machine Learning
Approach
In this section, we introduce our proposed approach for rev-
enue maximization in sponsored search, which we call a
game-theoretic machine learning approach1.
2.1 Preliminaries
According to [Caragiannis et al., 2012; Graepel et al., 2010;
Edelman et al., 2005; Varian, 2007], sponsored search auc-
tions can be mathematically formulated as follows. Assume
there are m ads from m advertisers; each advertiser i has a
value per click vi on his/her ad; and each ad i is represented
by a feature vector xi ∈ Rd.
1In the literature of online learning, there is a branch called
game-theoretic learning or adaptive mechanism design [Pardoe et
al., 2006]. The main difference between our work and theirs is that
we learn a mechanism based on historical data, while they optimize
the performance of the mechanism using an online scheme.
Before the auction starts, the search engine receives a bid
vector b = (b1, · · · , bi, · · · , bm) from the advertisers where
the i-th component bi is the bid of the i-th advertiser. When
the keyword is issued by a web user u, the search engine
will rank the ads according to the products of their quality
scores f(xi) and bid prices bi, and show the top-ranked ads
to the user. As a common practice, the quality score f(xi)
is defined as a compound function f(xi) = g(ĈTR(xi)),
where ĈTR(xi) predicts the click probability of ad i at the
top-1 position, and g(.) is a monotone function. In the liter-
ature, different g(.) functions have been used. For example,
g(t) = 1 was used by Yahoo! in early 2000s; later g(t) =
t has been used by several search engines; and recently
g(t) = tα has been considered [Lahaie and McAfee, 2011;
Lahaie and Pennock, 2007].
If ad i is placed at position j and is clicked by the user, ad-
vertiser i will be charged by the following amount of money
according to the Generalized Second Price rule,
Payf,b(i) =
f(xσf,b(j+1))bσf,b(j+1)
f(xi)
where σf,b(j) is the index of the ad ranked at position j
according to f(x)b.
The corresponding utility function for advertiser i can be
written as follows,
Utif,b(i) = [vi − Payf,b(i)]1{user u clicks on ad i}
where 1{.} is the indicator function.
The revenue of the search engine can be obtained as below,
r(b, f, u) =∑
i
Payf,b(σf,b(i))1{user u clicks on the ad at position i} (1)
Considering that in GSP, both the ranking and pricing rules
are determined once the quality score f is given, we will also
refer to f as the auction mechanism if there is no confusion
in the context.
2.2 Game Theory vs. Machine Learning
Given an auction mechanism space F , one of the goals of the
search engine is to design an auction mechanism f∗ ∈ F to
maximize its revenue. In the literature of game theory, there
have been some attempts along this direction. For example,
in [Lahaie and Pennock, 2007] the worst-case revenue in the
symmetric Nash equilibria is maximized, and in [Garg and
Narahari, 2009; Garg et al., 2007] the Bayesian optimal auc-
tion mechanism design is investigated with the value distri-
bution of the bidders as public knowledge. In these works,
some ideal assumptions have been employed. For instance,
one usually assumes that the values/bids (or their distribu-
tions) of the advertisers as well as the auction mechanism of
the search engine are publicly accessible; however, in reality,
an advertiser can only see the information about his/her own
ad (e.g., the bids and KPI associated with the ad in a certain
period of time) but have no access to the information of other
advertisers or the search engine. For another instance, it is
usually assumed that advertisers are rational enough to take
the best responses so as to maximize their utilities; however,
in reality, advertisers have very different and diverse bidding
behaviors: some advertisers are very active while some others
seldom change their bids; some are highly capable of plac-
ing near-optimal bids while some others are not. As a result,
the practical values of the aforementioned game-theoretic at-
tempts are not very clear.
In recent years, some machine learning researchers have
tried to optimize the empirical revenue of an auction mech-
anism based on historical bidding data, in order to avoid the
use of unrealistic game-theoretic assumptions. For example,
in [Zhu et al., 2009b; Zhu et al., 2009a],the authors pro-
pose to simultaneously optimize the revenue and relevance
of the auction mechanism on historical bidding data. How-
ever, these works actually introduce another kind of assump-
tion, which is about the i.i.d. distribution of bidding data.
This is a very foundational assumption used by statistical ma-
chine learning, which guarantees that the model learnt from
the training set can generalize to the future test set. Unfortu-
nately, this assumption does not hold either in the context of
sponsored search. As mentioned in the introduction, the so-
called second-order effect makes the optimal auction mecha-
nism on the historical bids no longer optimal since advertisers
will change their bids in response to the auction mechanism
in the future.
2.3 Bilevel Optimization Framework
We propose a bilevel optimization framework to address the
aforementioned problems with previous works. The frame-
work contains two levels of optimization, which models the
advertiser’s responses in the inner level and optimizes the rev-
enue of the search engine in the outer level. The framework
naturally combines game theory and machine learning, and
therefore we call it a game-theoretic machine learning ap-
proach.
The proposed framework can be intuitively depicted using
Figure 1, and can also be mathematically characterized as fol-
lows.
max
f∈F
R(f, g, S) (2)
s.t.min
g∈G
L(g, S) (3)
where S represents the historical data; G is the space of ad-
vertiser behavior models; L(g, S) is the loss function to facil-
itate the learning of the behavior model; F is the space of the
auction mechanisms; and R(f, g, S) is the empirical revenue
defined based on the historical data, the advertiser behavior
model, and the auction mechanism f .
As can be seen from the figure, two kinds of training data
are used: advertisers’ auction logs and web users’ query and
click-through logs. The former record the historical bids of
the advertisers in a period of time; the latter contain the key-
words issued by users and their click behaviors in the same
period. As indicated by the formulas, the inner level of our
framework is to learn a mechanism-dependent advertiser be-
havior model from historical auction logs, which is used to
predict advertisers’ bid changes in the future. Since the ad-
vertiser behavior model is mechanism-dependent, we can use
the model to predict advertisers’ future bid sequences based
on the users’ query and click-through data with respect to dif-
ferent auction mechanisms. Then the outer level is to learn the
Figure 1: Game-Theoretic Machine Learning Framework for
Auction Design
optimal auction mechanism in terms of the empirical revenue
on the predicted bid sequences.
Here we would like to emphasize that it is actually very
fundamental to model sponsored search using bilevel opti-
mization (and we regard this as one of our contributions). The
bilevel optimization framework cannot only characterize our
proposed approach, but also contain many previous works as
its special cases. For example, the framework can cover the
worst-case optimal mechanism design [Lahaie and Pennock,
2007] if the inner level optimization problem characterizes a
set of equilibrium conditions on the bids.
To realize the proposed framework, first of all, we need
to build a reasonable model space G to describe the advertis-
ers’ bidding behaviors. Second, we need to ensure that the
revenue computed on the predicted bids by using this model
can converge when the prediction period approaches infinity.
Only in this way, the subsequent revenue optimization pro-
cess will make sense. We will make detailed introduction of
how we deal with these difficulties in the next sections.
3 Markov Advertiser Model
In this section, we show that a Markov process can be used
to model how advertisers change their bids. Please note that
one can also employ other (more complicated) models in our
proposed bilevel optimization framework.
Intuitively, if an advertiser finds that his/her KPI in the last
period is below expectation, it is very likely that he/she will
increase the bid price in hope to get a better KPI (e.g., ranked
in higher positions or receive more clicks). On the other
hand, if an advertiser feels that the numbers of impressions
and clicks are satisfactory but the cost per click is higher than
expected, he/she may lower down the bid price. The Markov
property indicates that advertisers’ bid changes only depend
on their bids in a fixed number of previous time periods. For
simplicity here we only consider the time-homogenous first-
order Markov property (i.e., the next bid is independent of
pervious bids if the current bid is given, and the transition
matrix is time-invariant).
To be more specific, we denote the bid vector at time t as
bt = (bt1, · · · , bti, · · · , btm), in which the i-th component bti
is the bid of the i-th advertiser at time t. We assume the bid
prices that advertisers can assign come from a finite space
B. This assumption is reasonable considering that there is a
minimum bid unit in real sponsored search systems and the
bid price is always bounded.
Suppose in the t-th time period, a stream of users U t issue
the keyword and observe a number of ads. For each user u ∈
U t, if u clicks on an ad, the corresponding advertiser will pay
a certain amount of money to the search engine according to
the pricing rule of the auction. At the beginning of the (t+1)-
th time period, advertiser i will receive a report about the KPI
of his/her ad in the t-th period. We use kpiti to denote this
report, which can be considered as the output of a function
KPIi(b
t, U t, f). Based on kpiti, advertiser i may change
his/her bid price to bt+1i in order to be better off. That is,
P (bt+1i |bt, · · · ,bt, U1, · · · , U t, f) = P (bt+1i |bti, kpiti) (4)
Denote Mi,kpi as the transition matrix for advertiser i with
kpi.
Mi,kpi =
· · · · · · · · ·· · · pi,kpi(j, k) · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
 (5)
where the element pi,kpi(j, k) is the probability of advertiser
i changing his/her bid price from j to k given kpi, i.e.,
pi,kpi(j, k) = P (b
t+1
i = k|bti = j, kpi) (6)
Considering that kpit = (kpit1, · · · , kpitm) is a function of
bt, U t and auction mechanism f , and given kpit, advertis-
ers independently change their bids according to the Markov
processes, the probability of advertisers’ bid vector changing
from b to b′ can be written as,
P (bt+1 = b′|bt = b, U t, f) =
∏
i
pi,KPIi(b,Ut,f)(bi, b
′
i) (7)
It is clear that bt can also be considered as a Markov process
and the transition matrixQUt,f is a function of auction mech-
anism f and user stream U t. We refer to the matrix QU,f as
the advertiser behavior model.
For each advertiser i we observe {(bti, kpiti, bt+1i )}, t =
1, · · · , T in the historical auction logs and the correspond-
ing transition matrices Mi,kpi can be learnt from these ob-
servations. Here we consider two approaches to learn these
transition probabilities. The first is a non-parametric ap-
proach based on statistical estimation. To be concrete, to
estimate Mi,KPI(B1, B2), i.e. the probability of adver-
tiser i switching his/her bid value from B1 to B2 once his
kpi value is KPI , one use the term Mˆi,KPI(B1, B2) =∑T
t=1 1{kpit
i
=KPI,bt
i
=B1,b
t+1
i
=B2}∑T
t=1 1{kpit
i
=KPI,bt
i
=B1}
. That is, we use empirical
frequency to estimate expectation. Another approach takes
a parametric form. In particular, we assume for any t, the
probability of bt+1i is proportional to a truncated Gaussian
function p(b) = e−(b−µ)
2
, b ≥ 0, in which the value of µ
depends on (bti, kpi
t
i). We use a linear function to model this
dependency: for any advertiser i, denote zti = (b
t
i, kpi
t
i, 1),
then we have
µ =< w, zti > (8)
where w can be learnt by maximizing the log likelihood of
the observed data using gradient descent(which corresponds
to the inner level optimization).
w∗ = argminw(< w, z
t
i > −bt+1i )2 (9)
By using either of the two approaches, the advertiser be-
havior model can be constructed with the learnt Mi,kpi, and
we can use the model to predict the future bid prices given any
auction mechanism. In our experiments, we conducted both
non-parametric estimation approach and parametric learning
approach, and found that the latter is both more efficient and
accurate than the former, thus we will focus on the paramet-
ric learning approach in the remaining part of the paper. Once
the behavior model is built, tThen the search engine revenue
can be computed and optimized on the predicted mechanism-
dependent bid prices. Details of this process will be intro-
duced in the next section.
4 Empirical Revenue Maximization
In this section, we discuss how to optimize search engine rev-
enue over the bids predicted by the Markov advertiser be-
havior model. One may have noticed that with the Markov
model, the bid prices of the advertisers will always change
according to the transition matrix. Then a natural question is
whether the empirical revenue on such dynamically changing
bid prices will converge when the time period approaches in-
finity. In the following subsections, we will first give a proof
for the convergence, and then propose a Genetic Program-
ming method to optimize the empirical revenue.
4.1 Convergence Analysis
First, we formally define the empirical revenue for a given
period of time.
Definition 1. Given the bid vector bt and user stream U t at
each time t = 1, · · · , T , the empirical revenue for the search
engine with auction mechanism f is defined as follows,
R(b1, · · · ,bT, U1, · · · , UT , f) = 1
T
T∑
t=1
∑
u∈Ut
r(bt, f, u) (10)
Next we show that under certain conditions the empirical
revenue will converge in probability. The proof has two com-
ponents: first we prove the existence of the expectation of
the empirical revenue (we call it expected revenue), and then
we prove the variance of empirical revenue approaches zero
when the time period approaches infinity.
Lemma 1. If user stream U t is stochastically i.i.d. sampled
and the expectation of the Markov transition matrix with re-
spect to user stream EUQU,f is positive for auction mecha-
nism f , limT→∞ ER(b1, · · · , bT , U1, · · · , UT , f) exists.
Proof. Considering that U t is independent of bt, the ex-
pected revenue can be formulated as follows,
ER(b1, · · · ,bT, U1, · · · , UT , f)
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
∑
b∈{B}M
[EU1,··· ,Ut−1P (b
t = b)× E
∑
u∈U
r(b, f, u)]
It is clear that by taking expectation over U1, · · · , U t−1, the
bid vector b follows a Markov process with transition matrix
Qf = EUQU,f . Considering that EUQU,f is positive, the
Markov process will lead to its stationary distribution piQf ,
therefore we have,
lim
T→∞
ER(b1, · · · ,bT, U1, · · · , UT , f)
=
∑
b∈{B}m
[piQf (b)× EU
∑
u∈U
r(b, f, u)]
where piQf (b) is the probability of the state b in the station-
ary distribution.
Lemma 2. If the user stream U t is stochastically
i.i.d. sampled, and the expected Markov transition ma-
trix EUQU,f is positive for auction mechanism f , then
limT→∞ V arR(b1, · · · ,bT , U1, · · · , UT , f) = 0 .
The proof of Lemma 2 is similar to that of Lemma 1.We
omit it due to space restrictions. By jointly considering the
two lemmas, it is easy to obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For ∀ > 0, there exists δ(, T ) that converges
to zero as T approaches infinity, satisfying
P (|R(b1, · · · ,bT, U1, · · · , UT , f) (11)
− ER(b1, · · · ,bT, U1, · · · , UT , f)| > ) < δ(, T ).
4.2 Optimization Algorithm
According to the theoretical guarantee given in the previous
subsection, the optimal auction mechanism f∗ ∈ F can be
learnt based on the converged value of the empirical revenue.
In this section, we introduce our proposed algorithm to ful-
fill this task. The algorithm has three components, advertiser
behavior learning, empirical revenue simulation, and auction
mechanism learning. We call it a bilevel optimization algo-
rithm, or BOA for short. For ease of reference, we summarize
our algorithm in Table 1.
Assume that we have advertisers’ auction logs and users’
query and click-through logs in T time periods for training.
The first step is to learn the parametric transition matrices
M∗i,kpi based on this training data and construct Q
∗
U,f . As
shown in Section 3, this step can be achieved by means of
maximum likelihood estimation. Then given the learnt ad-
vertiser behavior model, it is a natural idea to select the opti-
mal auction mechanism according to the following expected
revenue. ∑
b∈{B}m
[piQf (b)× EU
∑
u∈U
r(b, f, u)]
Considering that the empirical revenue will converge to the
expected revenue, it suffices to optimize the empirical rev-
enue on a sufficiently long period of time. To achieve this
goal, we leverage the learnt advertiser behavior model to pre-
dict the bids for another N time periods (please note that this
prediction is a part of our learning algorithm, and N can be
much larger than T ). The prediction is performed in the fol-
lowing manner. With an initial bid profile b1, for any time
1 ≤ t ≤ N , we randomly sample a piece of user data Uˆ t
from the training set. Then we are able to rank the ads ac-
cording to bt and auction mechanism f , check the clicks ofU t
on the shown ads based on the historical users click-through
logs, and compute kpiti for each advertiser i. Based on kpi
t
i,
we sample advertiser i’s next bid bt+1i according to the learnt
Table 1: The Bilevel Optimization Algorithm
Bilevel Optimization Algorithm (BOA):
Advertiser Behavior Learning (ABL):
Input : Advertisers’ bids bt, t = 1, · · · , T .
Advertiser’s KPI reports kpit, t = 1, · · · , T .
1. Train the advertiser behavior model by maximizing the
log likelihood function in Equ (9).
Output : The parametric transition matrix M∗i,kpi
Empirical Revenue Simulation (ERS)
Input : The transition matrices M∗i,kpi, auction mechanism f .
User streams U t, t = 1, · · · , T
Advertisers’ initial bids b1, sampling length N
A predefined non-negative constant δ
1. For each t, uniformly sampling Uˆ t from {U t, t = 1, · · · , T}
2. At each time 1 ≤ t ≤ N , if there exists a mechanism f ′ satisfying
d(f ′, f) ≤ δ, and the bidding data sampling process for f ′ has been
done before, then use the simulated bidding data under f ′ as the bidding
data under f , otherwise use Uˆ t, auction mechanism f , M∗i,kpi, and b
t to
predictbt+1.
3. Compute the empirical revenue over the predicted bid sequence.
Output: The empirical revenue of mechanism f .
Auction Mechanism Learning (AML)
Input : The transition matrices M∗i,kpi.
Auction mechanism space F
User streams U t, t = 1, · · · , T
1. Initialize K random auction mechanisms f1, · · · fK .
2. For each auction mechanism f do
2.1. Compute each f ’s revenue according to the ERS step.
2.2. Use f ’s empirical revenue as the fitness function.
3. New K mechanisms are created by applying genetic operators.
Output: The best mechanism f∗.
transition matrices M∗i,kpi. Therefore the empirical revenue
of mechanism f over these N time periods can be computed.
As shown in Eqn(1), the empirical revenue is a complex func-
tion of f due to the second-price formula. We therefore em-
ploy the Genetic Programming method for its optimization.
Genetic Programming is an evolutionary algorithm developed
in the field of artificial intelligence, which can handle com-
plex, non-linear functional relationships.
Here we introduce a method named δ-sampling technique
to improve the efficiency of the empirical revenue simulation
process. Note that to sample the advertisers’ bid for each
mechanism is infeasible since the mechanism class may be
infinite. Therefore, for a mechanism a and a predefined non-
negative constant δ, if there exists a mechanism a′ satisfying
d(a, a′) ≤ δ, where d(·, ·) is a distance measure between two
mechanisms, and the bidding data for a′ has been sampled
before, we use the empirical bidding data under a′ as an sur-
rogate for bidding data under a, thus avoiding the sampling
process under a. By the δ-sampling technique, we greatly im-
prove the efficiency of the proposed optimization algorithm.
5 Experiments
In this section, we report our experimental results on the ef-
fectiveness of our proposed approach. For simplicity and
without loss of generality, we assume that the quality score
has the mathematical form of f(x) = (ĈTR(x))α. The task
of auction mechanism learning then reduces to finding the
best parameter α. This setting has also been used in some
other works, such as [Lahaie and Pennock, 2007].
5.1 Experimental Settings
Since it is impractical to get the online responses of the ad-
vertisers and web users to any learnt auction mechanism, we
choose to use a simulation-based experiment. Simulation-
based experiments have been widely used in the field of on-
line advertising for algorithm evaluation [Li et al., 2010;
Jordan and Wellman, 2010]. Generally speaking, we first col-
lect a dataset containing the queries and clicks of web users
as well as the bids of advertisers in a period of time. Con-
sidering that the clicks and bids in the dataset were generated
when a previous auction mechanism was used, we could not
use them to evaluate new auction mechanisms due to the sec-
ond order effect. Therefore, we remove all such information
in the dataset and simulate advertisers’ bid changes and users’
clicks with respect to an underlying auction mechanism using
some state-of-the-art behavior models.
Specifically, we use a log data of 300 days obtained from
a commercial search engine. We randomly sample ten key-
words from the data that contains 1053 advertisers’ bid his-
tory, and collect all the information about the advertisers and
users that have bidden or queried these keywords in the log
data. We use the first 100 days to estimate some basic pa-
rameters in our experiments (e.g., the CTR and the valua-
tion of each ad) and to construct the training data with the
simulation-based method by assuming the auction mecha-
nism to be standard GSP (α = 1 in the quality score). We
then use the remaining 200 days as the test set to compare
different mechanisms, and the simulated bids on the test set
will be different when different mechanisms are evaluated.
We follow the method described in [Richardson et al.,
2007] to estimate ĈTR(xi). We also compute a position dis-
count factor βj by aggregating all the click information. We
then simulate users’ click behaviors by assuming ad i to have
a probability of ĈTR(xi)βj to be clicked if it is ranked at po-
sition j. When estimating the valuation of an ad, we simply
use its largest bid in the original dataset.2 Then we use adver-
tisers’ bids in the first day as their initial bids and simulate the
bid changes using a mixture model, which is based on three
advertiser models proposed in the literature.
1) Best Response Model(BRM) [Edelman et al., 2005]. It
assumes that each advertiser knows exactly the bids of all
his/her competitors in any round of auction. On this basis,
he/she will take the best-response bid strategy.
2) Analytical model(AM) [Pin and Key, 2011]. The model
does not assume full information about the bids of advertis-
ers, instead assumes the distribution of the number of adver-
tisers and the distribution of the bid prices of advertisers to be
available as public knowledge. On this basis, each advertiser
takes the strategy that maximizes his/her expected utility.
2Please note that we take this approach for sake of simplicity.
One can choose more complicated methods [Pin and Key, 2011] to
estimate the values.
Figure 2: Revenue Comparisons
3) Stable Behavior Model(SBM). As discussed in the in-
troduction, many advertisers rarely change their bids. This
model assumes that advertisers are lazy and never change
their bid prices even if the auction mechanism is changed.
In the mixture model, we uniformly sample the coefficients
p1, p2, p3 from a multinomial distribution, and then select p1
fraction of advertisers to behave according to BRM, p2 frac-
tion of advertisers to behave according to AM, and the rest to
behave according to SBM.
We implement three baselines to compare with our pro-
posed approach.
1) The GSP model: the classical GSP auction mechanism
with α = 1 in the quality score f .
2) The Worst-Case Analysis (WCA) model: a state-of-the-
art optimal mechanism design method [Lahaie and Pennock,
2007]which studies the revenue in symmetric Nash equilibria
and selects the auction mechanism by worst case analysis.
3) The Directly-Learnt Auction (DLA) model: the optimal
auction mechanism is directly learnt based on historical log
data without considering the second order effect.
When estimating the Markov transition matrix, we run
the gradient decent algorithm for 500 iterations. Our pro-
posed BOA algorithm leverages this Markov model and com-
putes the empirical revenue with N = 1000. When us-
ing the Genetic Programming algorithm for empirical rev-
enue optimization, we set the number of individuals in each
generation as 10, the number of generations as 50, and
crossover/mutation/reproduction rates as 70%/20%/10% re-
spectively. To make our experiments robust, we sample the
coefficients in the mixture model for 100 times, and report
the average performance in the experimental evaluation.
In the δ-sampling, we set the distance as d(α1, α2) = |α1−
α2| and δ is set to be 0.01.
5.2 Experimental Results
Figure 2 shows the performances of the auction mechanism
learnt by our proposed BOA approach as well as the baseline
mechanisms. The x-axis corresponds to the length of simu-
lated test data, whose unit is day; and the y-axis corresponds
to the average revenue, which is normalized to [0,10] to avoid
the disclosure of sensitive business information.
We have the following observations from the figure:
1) When the size of the test data grows, the average perfor-
mances of different methods become stable and the compar-
isons between their performances become clear.
2) The performances of BOA and WCA are better than
GSP (with relative improvements of 8.9% and 2.2% respec-
tively), which indicates that both our proposed approach and
the game-theoretic approach for revenue optimization are ef-
fective. Furthermore, BOA is statistically significantly better
than WCA and GSP with a p-value=0.05, while WCA does
not pass the significance test against GSP. This implies that
our approach is more effective than previous approaches.
3) The performance of DLA is worse than GSP (with a rel-
ative decrease of 4.8%), and the result is statistically signifi-
cant with a p-value=0.05. This demonstrates the huge impact
of the second-order effect on the experimental results. Due to
the strong response from the advertisers to the auction mech-
anism, simply adopting classical machine learning methods
cannot lead to an effective auction mechanism.
From the experiments, we can clearly see the effectiveness
of our proposed algorithm and verify our theoretical analysis.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have proposed a game-theoretic machine
learning approach to deal with the revenue optimization in
sponsored search auctions. Specifically, we have proposed a
Markov model to describe how advertisers change their bids,
and then use the model to learn the auction mechanism that
optimizes search engine’s revenue on the predicted bids. The
experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our pro-
posal. As for the future work, we plan to consider other fac-
tors in our learning process, e.g.,the reserved price. We also
plan to investigate on more comprehensive advertiser behav-
ior models.
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